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Online Antagonism of the Alt-Right




1 The 2016 election evoked concerns over the decline in the level of political discourse.
Among  these  was  the  lament  “Make  Trolling  Great  Again,”  by  which  Emma  Green
referred to  the  spiteful  provocations  emanating from the political  fringes.i The “alt-
right,”  short  for  alternative  right,  was  both  a  harbinger  and  culmination  of  these
tendencies during the election. It includes white nationalists and disillusioned right-wing
dissidents  who  draw  from  theories  like  neoreaction,  a  political  theory  that  is
contemptuous  of  modernism,  democracy,  and  egalitarianism,  and  favors  a  form  of
“nondemocratic system with rule-driven succession.”ii As an online movement, it also has
firm links with participatory media networks through websites such as 4chan, 8chan, and
Reddit,  along  with  meme  and  troll  culture.iii The  alt-right  capitalized  on  the  anti-
immigration and anti-establishment  campaign themes of  Donald Trump to  thrust  its
ideas into the political mainstream. Just as Trump made use of social media, the alt-right
utilized memes—and like Trump, the movement attracted attention and visibility through
provocations and sensationalism. 
2 This orientation can also be understood as a part of the broader contemporary political
landscape. Along with the decline of traditional party politics and the emergence of forms
of  anti-politics,iv scholars  have  identified  the  increasing  stylization  of  politics  where
emphasis  on  aesthetic  features  of  appearance  and  performance  is  important.v For
example, Frank Ankersmit’s contention of interaction and interference, of collapsing of
style  and  content,  seems  to  fit  the  meme-ing  efforts  of  the  alt-right  as  well  as  the
grandiose  rhetoric  of  Trump.vi As  scholars  of  political  communication  have  noted,
Trump’s reality TV status and brand name combined various pop culture elements with
populism,  eschewing  the  separation  between  entertainment  and  politics.vii Likewise,
similar stylistic and rhetorical maneuvers can be found with regard to the alt-right. In an
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intensely mediated and stylized landscape, the notions of spectacle and celebrity have
become essential features of politics.viii Understanding the role of the popular in carrying
political messages more generally, as argued by John Street, is not just “about persuading
people  through  the  force  of  the  argument,”  but  also  “about  capturing  the  popular
imagination,  about  giving  acts  and  ideas  symbolic  importance.”ix Street’s  reasoning
points  to the possibilities  of  popular  codes of  communication,  which can be used to
advance a diverse set of goals and are part of a more complex relationship.
3 In a study of white nationalism and popular culture, C. Richard King and David J. Leonard
draw out some of these interconnections: “The efforts from white nationalists to produce
their  own popular  culture  products  in  opposition to  mainstream films,  music,  video
games, and other cultural productions, some of which we too consume, illustrate the way
in which white nationalists penetrate and engage the mainstream daily.”x While the alt-
right did not engage with popular culture in these terms, its oppositional efforts included
adopting pop culture references and the use of  Internet memes,  which were notably
present during the 2016 election. Also, the movement’s engagement with and creation of
a unique style and terminology means that its ideology has been somewhat difficult to
understand and it has remained isolated within certain corners of the Internet, reaching
only  likeminded  online  supporters.  However,  among  the  contributing  factors  and
mechanisms through which new political actors gain power, the media, when coupled
with “the popular,” “can form dangerously intolerant alliances,” as Liesbeth van Zoonen
reminds.xi In this context, the election campaigns of Trump and Clinton, along with the
media,  channeled  the  alt-right,  at  least  momentarily,  into  the  broader  political
conversation. Therefore, the purpose and goal of this article is to position the rise of the
alt-right  against  the  background  of  the  electoral  process  and  to  link  its  ideological
elements with the efforts and tactics to engage and shape the broader political discourse.
First, in order to understand how the alt-right “swayed the election,” I will examine the
movement and its actions in relation to the media and the Trump and Clinton campaigns.
Secondly, drawing from previous studies on online antagonismsxii and memetic media,xiii I
will examine how visual and rhetorical means facilitated and popularized the “alt-right’s”
controversial messages in the 2016 election.
 
2. The Alternative Right in the Making
4 A number of media pundits and analysts have attempted to outline key features of the alt-
right. However, the amorphous, ideologically diffuse, and largely online movement has
inevitably  posed difficulties  for  attempts  to  describe,  explain,  or  fit  it  into  a  simple
narrative. For movement conservatives, George Hawley argues, free market principles,
traditional  values,  and  aggressive  foreign  policy  have  been  “the  three  legs  of  the
conservative  stool.”xiv The alt-right  movement,  in  contrast,  breaks  from conservative
foreign policy and free trade orthodoxy in favor of  higher cultural  ideals,  coalescing
around issues they oppose, namely multiculturalism, (non-white) immigration, feminism,
and  “political  correctness.”xv Indeed,  one  of  the  unifying  factors  is  the  belief  that
mainstream conservatives have sold out white people as a group. “As the movement grew
and diversified,” Shane Burley suggests, “it has become a catchall for an Internet focused
white nationalism.”xvi If movement conservatism was defined by William F. Buckley, alt-
right  members  have  been  influenced  by  and  often  cite  ideas  of  thinkers  like  H.  L.
Mencken  (skepticism of  democracy  and  egalitarianism),  Julius  Evola  (traditionalism),
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Oswald Spengler (cultural pessimism and organic and a cyclical vision of history), and
Friedrich Nietzsche (“will to power,” iconoclasm).xvii Hence, culture is seen as the primary
value and a site of political action, often expressed in racial terms as preservation of
white culture and identity. 
5 As the term “alt-right” gained publicity, media coverage commonly situated it in relation
to Donald Trump. Linking the alt-right’s newly found prominence to the ethos of the
Trump campaign, Rosie Gray summarized the movement as “white supremacy perfectly
tailored to our times: 4chan-esque racist rhetoric combined with a tinge of Silicon Valley-
flavored  philosophizing,  all  riding  on  the  coattails  of  the  Trump  boom.”xviii Other
mainstream commentators  expressed  similar  sentiments,  taking  note  of  the  growing
enthusiasm  of  white  nationalists  for  Trump’s  primary  campaign.xix Dylan  Matthews,
however,  argues  that  the  alt-right  is  “more  than  a  simple  rebranding  of  the  white
nationalist movement.” Instead, he sees it as the “mutated revival of a monster William F.
Buckley thought he killed in the early 1990s, given new energy by the web,” referring to
the influence of the John Birch Society, Pat Buchanan, and paleoconservatism (a political
philosophy which, among other things, stresses restrictions on immigration, economic
nationalism, and isolationist foreign policy).xx According to Matthews, the alt-right finds
its most notable expression not only in rejection of mainstream conservatism but in the
form of neoreaction.xxi Among the intellectual origins of the alt-right are the foundational
texts of neoreaction like Nick Land’s “The Dark Enlightenment.”xxii
6 If the ideology of neoreaction is characterized by the rejection of democracy and reform
altogether, then for Richard Spencer, the President of the National Policy Institute (NPI),
a white nationalist think tank, the central element of the alt-right is found in the notion
of  “identitarianism.”  Spencer  sees  identitarianism  as  being  “fundamentally  about
difference, about culture as an expression of a certain people at a certain time.”xxiii The
identitarian position is related to the ideas of “race realism” or “human biodiversity”
(HBD) advanced in magazines and on websites like American Renaissance, Radix Journal, and
Taki’s  Magazine.  This  racial  ideology manifests  in terms of  distinction and inequality,
whereby not only individuals but racial groups are seen as unequal in relation to each
other.xxiv For example, the founder of American Renaissance, Jared Taylor, has questioned
the equality of the races and advocates the idea that “[s]ome races are better at some
things than others.”xxv Spencer, in turn, has promoted similar views about race, which he
sees as forming the ideological core of the alt-right. Among other things, “Spencer’s so-
called ‘race realism,’ according to Shane Burley, “underpins theories of racial hierarchy,
and the idea that it has a basis in biology.”xxvi While some strains of the alt-right, like
neoreaction, reject white nationalism, the latter notion forms the core of the movement,
which  includes  neo-Nazi  elements,  with  more  moderate  non-ideological  online
provocateurs lurking on the edges of the radical right.xxvii 
7 Spencer and Taylor have adopted softer or,  ironically,  “politically correct” terms like
“identitarianism” and “human biodiversity.” However, the editor of the neo-Nazi website
Daily  Stormer, Andrew  Anglin,  is  more  straightforward.  He  identifies  anti-Semitism,
scientific  racism,  white  nationalism,  opposition  to  gender  equality,  cultural
normalization,  and common sense economics as elemental  values in his  guide to the
movement.  For  Anglin,  irony  is  a  central  element  that  creates  confusion  in  the
mainstream  culture.  “The  true  nature  of  the  movement  is,  however,  serious  and
idealistic,” Anglin writes. Ideological seriousness is represented in and has taken the form
of irony as part of the postmodern condition: “[I]t was my contention that in an age of
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nihilism, absolute idealism must be couched in irony in order to be taken seriously.”xxviii
This nihilistic ethos is closely linked to online activities through meme and troll culture,
as  well  as  conspiracy  theorizing.  In  order  to  get  people  to  accept  ideas  which were
previously too controversial, Anglin strives both to entertain and to inform, to appear
serious and playful at the same time.xxix
8 The prevalence of meme and troll culture is echoed in a widely circulated article, “An
Establishment  Conservatives  Guide  to  the  Alt-Right,”  by  Allum  Bokhari  and  former
Breitbart News tech editor and political provocateur Milo Yiannopoulos. In an attempt to
explain  and  defend the  alt-right,  they  diverge  from the  ideological  commitments  of
Spencer, Taylor, and Anglin. Instead, Yiannopoulos and Bokhari highlight the alt-right’s
subcultural  origins,  citing  imageboard  sites  such  as  4chan and  8chan as  the  central
support  network  for  the  movement.  For  these  youthful  and  subversive  online
communities, shock value is a basis for action. Yiannopoulos and Bukhari acknowledge
the evident racism of some of the comments and images but argue that the message is
only a means to elicit reactions and should not be taken seriously. In support of this, they
draw parallels with the 1960s counterculture: 
Just as the kids of the 60s shocked their parents with promiscuity, long hair and
rock’n’roll, so too do the alt-right’s young meme brigades shock older generations
with  outrageous  caricatures,  from  the  Jewish  ‘Shlomo  Shekelburg’  to  ‘Remove
Kebab,’ an internet in-joke about the Bosnian genocide. These caricatures are often
spliced together with Millennial pop culture references, from old 4chan memes like
pepe the frog, to anime and My Little Pony references.xxx
9 On the one hand, the article was condemned in the mainstream as a defense of a racist
movement.  On  the  other,  it  revealed  tensions  between  ideological  distinctions  and
commitments.  Andrew  Anglin,  for  example,  adamantly  opposed  the  idea  that  they
weren’t serious, describing Yiannopoulos as a “kike infiltrator” who was threatening the
movement.  In  his  in-depth  analysis,  Luke  O’Brien  observes  that  “Yiannopoulos  had
exposed  a  rift  between  the  Spencer  and  Anglin  wings  of  the  alt-right.”  While  both
advocate white nationalism, different goals separate Anglin and Spencer. O’Brien sees
Anglin  as  a  purist  and  Spencer  as  someone  who  reaches  beyond  core  ideological
commitments.xxxi Thus, their main distinction concerns tactics and style. To put this in a
broader  context,  Roger  Griffin  has  examined  what  he  refers  to  as  the  process  of
metapoliticization of fascism. By this he means the post-war political climate in which it
was impossible to attract any kind of mass following or to build a political party around
fascist ideology, even as the production of ideological discourses took on different guises
that  could operate  outside  of  organized politics.  In  particular,  Griffin  notes  that  the
European New Right (Nouvelle Droite) has provided the most sophisticated disguise for the
radical  right  by  adopting  a  form  over  content  approach,  which  includes  emulating
academic production in terms of discourse and format.xxxii Similar tendencies can be seen
regarding the alt-right,  albeit with often oppositional styles.  For example,  Anglin has
embraced a hardline approach while leading the alt-right’s “meme and troll brigade,”
whereas Spencer has aimed to operate with a “softer” means and intellectual tone (NPI,
Radix Journal, etc.), aligning with the European New Right in many respects. Hence, along
with  the  metapolitical  approach  and  ethno-nationalist  principles,  Spencer  and  other
prominent  alt-right  figures  adopted the  term “identitarian”  from the  European New
Right.xxxiii
10 Amongst different ideological, tactical, and stylistic approaches, commonalities arise in
the cultivation of a position that sees white male identity as threatened. This conviction
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is expressed in exaggerated language and conspiratorial terms like “white genocide.”xxxiv
Another  striking  feature  is  that  most  of  the  members  are  young,  white  men,  often
described as tech-savvy and college-educated, who use social media, message boards, and
memes to convey ideas.xxxv Aja Romano points out that anti-feminist causes, including the
“men’s rights” movement, provided a crossover point from the online “manosphere” to
alt-right communities.xxxvi Dexter Thomas captures the element of “marketing strategy”
for racial politics: “They’re making being racist cool again for a certain class of people.”
xxxvii These contemporary modes blend with traditionalist positions that,  among other
things, see the West in decline and call for the reinstatement of traditional hierarchies
and roles. A favorite pop culture allusion and key concept is the notion of “red-pilled,”
which,  in  reference  to  the  movie  The  Matrix,  is  used  to  describe  “awakening  to  the
underlying realities” (alt-right, neoreaction, racial, etc.).xxxviii Most broadly, members of
the alt-right are united in their opposition to “political correctness,” which, as Nicole
Hemmer points out, also functions as a cover for racism, misogyny, and anti-Semitism.xxxix
In the context of the elections, different strands have also been tied together by their
support for Donald Trump. Taken together, stylistic elements, the nihilistic ethos, and
ideological positions are intrinsically linked to the wider objective to alter the Overton
window, referring to the range of acceptable ideas within public debate. Some ideas are
deemed as unthinkable and thus fall outside the window.xl Hence, through the Trump
campaign, there was an opportunity to inject alt-right ideas into mainstream U.S. politics
by means of visual and rhetorical provocations. 
 
3. Trump Support Online: Antagonizing the
Conservative Establishment
11 Perhaps the most vocal online support for Trump was channeled through websites like
Reddit, 4chan, and 8chan. In addition to enthusiasm for the Trump campaign, 4chan and
especially its “politically incorrect” /pol/ board has been increasingly interpreted as an
intersection of online culture and alt-right ideas.xli For example, Oliver Lee has reported
how  alt-right  ideas  started  to  resonate  with  many  /pol/  users,  who  then  adopted
extremist rhetoric in order to combat what they describe as an “anti-white agenda” in
the mainstream culture. When Trump attacked immigration and political correctness,
these views were then echoed and amplified on 4chan and similar online sites, solidifying
his growing online support base. In accordance with meme and troll culture, one user
described Trump as “meme-able” and “entertaining” and said that through Trump, alt-
right “ideas have gained much greater influence.”xlii On Reddit, r/The_Donald became the
most popular subreddit for a presidential candidate, receiving close to 52 million views in
March 2016, “up from 12.6 million in February and 1.3 million in January.” Benjy Sarlin
writes that “[t]he goal was to foster a community where Trump fans could be themselves
in all their glory without apology…. It’s since spread to the broader network of Trump
supporters.”xliii
12 These  tendencies  played  out,  for  example,  when  Trump  retweeted  a  graphic  that
originated from a  white  nationalist  Twitter  account.  The  graphic  claimed that  black
people kill 81% of white homicide victims. The claim was checked and called “racially
loaded”  and  “wildly  inaccurate”  by  PolitiFact.xliv This  kind  of  flirtation  with  white
nationalist ideas prompted Andrew Anglin to describe it as “wink-wink-wink” strategy, as
a kind of subtle recognition of these views on Trump’s part.xlv In turn, some alt-right
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Trump supporters adopted the term “Glorious Leader” in reference to Trump. In July
2016, Trump tweeted an image of Clinton next to a pile of dollars and a Jewish star with
the words “Most Corrupt Candidate Ever” imprinted on it. Andrew Anglin clearly saw the
tweet as a part of the “wink-wink-wink” strategy, as he wrote that “[t]his is, yet again,
dog-whistling by the Leader.” Alongside numerous anti-Semitic comments, some Daily
Stormer users wondered whether Trump got the meme from the /pol/ board, where it had
appeared earlier.xlvi Based on the enthusiastic reception, perhaps Anglin was not that far
off with his assessment regarding the “wink-wink-wink” strategy. 
13 Less ambiguously, by March 2016 Breitbart News was seen as being heavily intertwined
with the Trump campaign. At the same time, more solid links between the website and
the  alt-right  were  established.xlvii In  July,  the  executive  chairman  of  Breitbart  News,
Stephen Bannon, declared in an interview that it is “the platform for the alt-right.”xlviii
Although the “alt-right’s” origins lie elsewhere, Breitbart News was “the entering wedge,
the link between the alt-right and the mainstream right,” as Nicole Hemmer noted.xlix The
appointment of Bannon as the chief executive of Trump campaign best exemplifies the
extent of these connections.
14 In  contrast  to  Breitbart  News, National  Review  came  to  epitomize  the  anti-Trump
sentiments  within  the  mainstream of  conservatism.  The  antipathy  of  National  Review
toward Trump and his supporters reflected the magazine’s historical gatekeeper role of
conservative opinion.  The founder of  National  Review,  William F.  Buckley,  successfully
excised “unsavory ideological elements” like the John Birch Society out of the movement.
In  the  age  of  the  Internet  and social  media,  however,  the  role  of  the  establishment
gatekeepers has waned, as revealed in February 2016, when National Review dedicated an
entire  issue  to  discredit  Trump  but  with  seemingly  little  impact.l These  mutual
antipathies led to a controversy as early as September 2015.
15 Under the headline “No Movement That Embraces Trump Can Call Itself Conservative,”
Jonah  Goldberg  attacked  the  “corrupting  of  conservatism.”  For  Goldberg,  the
“corruptors” of conservatism were Trump and his supporters, and he compared them to
liberals  enthralled  with  celebrities:  “We  laugh  at  liberals  who  let  know-nothing
celebrities do their thinking for them. Well, many people we laughed at are now laughing
at us because we are going ga-ga over our own celebrity.”li The column elicited a hostile
reaction, including anti-Semitic abuse on social media, and it provoked a wider backlash
against National Review as the hashtag “NRORevolt” began trending on Twitter. As part of
a  long-standing  critique  of  movement  conservatives,  the  revolt  used  a  popular
expression, the slur “cuckservative,” short for “cuckolded conservative.”lii Although the
“cuckservative” narrative gained prominence after Rush Limbaugh called Trump critics
“cuckolded Republicans,” Jeet Heer locates the origins of the term in white nationalist
websites,  where  it  is  used  to  refer  to  white  conservative  (race)  “sellout.”liii The
“cuckservative” narrative represented the anti-establishment mood embodied by the alt-
right. It intertwined subcultural jargon and ideas of masculinity and race, all elemental
for the controversies that led the alt-right to be widely recognized and discussed. 
16 The original meaning of “cuckold” refers to a man with an unfaithful wife, whereas its
racial  undertones  derive  from  its  current  association  as  a  genre  of  porn.  Milo
Yiannopoulos rejected the idea that the popularization of the term emanated from white
nationalist  websites  with  the  racial  characteristics  associated  with  the  porn  genre.
Instead, he emphasized its provenance from 4chan, where “cuck” is used as an insult for
someone who is surrendering or selling out supporters. He saw the popularization as a
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testimony of the increasing influence of online culture amid many right-wing supporters.
liv Alternatively, Richard Spencer diverged from this interpretation, embracing the racial
narrative: “The #cuckservative meme doesn’t make any sense without race. It’s all about
race…. What’s powerful about #cuckservative is that it  is  a call  for racially conscious
politics[.]”lv In  effect,  the  “cuckservative”  narrative  resonated  widely  because  it  was
articulated through overlapping layers of potential meaning: the recognizable metaphor
had racist connotations and an anti-establishment bent, both of which shift with ease
between  different  contexts.lvi The  meme  was  given  emotional  weight  through  the
heightened emphasis on masculinity and white identity.
17 For  example,  Spencer  stated  that  “Trump  is  a  big  part  of  the  ‘cuckservative’
phenomenon,” not because of his ideology, but because he is a “tougher and superior man
than ‘conservatives’  and seems to grasp the demographic  displacement of  European-
Americans at a visceral level.”lvii While the Trump campaign did not directly take part in
the  “cuckservative”  meme,  it  can be  argued that  it  provoked similar,  albeit  subtler,
sentiments.  Following  an  argument  by  Ryan  Milner  and  Whitney  Phillips,  Trump’s
campaign platform itself  was  not  based  upon solid  ideas,  but  built  around resonant
memes. By evoking memetic ideas, such as the notion of “Crooked Hillary,” he managed
to exploit existing anxieties and biases.lviii Similarly, when Trump attacked Marco Rubio
as  “little  Marco” and Jeb Bush as  “low-energy Jeb,” he tapped into broader ideas  of
“emasculated  conservatives,”  which  in  turn  were  amplified  through  memes.  As
formulated by Milner and Phillips: “These ideas are memetic; each resonates independent
of factual realities, to the point of countering factual realities.”lix The “cuckservative”
meme, besides being an example of popularization of alt-right ideas, served as a reminder
of increasing online and social media antagonism in the election.
 
4. “Attention is Their Life Force”: Alt-Right in the
(Social) Media Spotlight
18 A  typical  example  of  a  social  media  campaign  instigated  by  the  alt-right  was  the
harassment of the comedy actor Leslie Jones, which garnered increasing media attention
for the alt-right,  with even Hillary Clinton taking time to comment and criticize the
movement.  Following  the  release  of  the  new  Ghostbusters  movie  in  July  2016,  Milo
Yiannopoulos and a number of his followers and members of the alt-right community
started to abuse Leslie Jones on social media. In response to the harassment campaign,
which was full of sexism, racism, and odious memes, Jones started to retweet some of the
abusive messages she had received, which led Twitter to take note and ultimately ban
Yiannopoulos from the service. The worst vitriol against Jones ceased for a moment, but
returned in late August when her personal website was hacked.lx The racist harassment
and hacking of Jones served, as Aja Romano writes, as “a flashpoint in the alt-right’s
escalating culture war.”lxi The movement’s problematic relationship with the media was
outlined by Chava Gourarie: “[I]f the primary purpose of the alt-right is to provoke, then
attention is their life force and media attention their fuel.”lxii As a direct attack on racial
and  gender  identity,  this  posed  a  paradox:  repeating  aggressive  rhetoric  and  racist
imagery has the risk of perpetuating their circulation, while ignoring the behavior has
the risk of ignoring their potential consequences.lxiii
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19 In her article on the online activist collective Anonymous and 4chan, Whitney Phillips has
examined the commonalities between trolling and media practices and how they feed
into each other, describing it as a kind of cybernetic feedback loop. She argues that an
accrual of “lulz”—adapted from a misspelling of “lol”—counts for trolls as the accrual of
capital does for the media, as it is serious business that seeks to gain the biggest possible
audience.  Phillips  notes  that  similarities  between  trolls  and  media  arise  from  their
common investment in spectacle, and she argues that trolls specifically seek to exploit
the sensationalist practices and other dominant tendencies in contemporary culture.lxiv In
the case of the alt-right, however, the notion of “trolling” is misleading, as the use of the
term has been increasingly criticized.  For example,  Romano observes that the online
performance of trolling increasingly overlaps with real life. To view the propagation of
racist memes by members of the alt-right as mere trolling, on the basis of which one
might  dismiss  the behavior,  distorts  the actual  message and downplays  the ideology
behind it.lxv Phillips had made a similar argument about characterizations of Trump as a
troll. In particular, Phillips points out that the troll description not only trivializes his
actual  behavior and comments,  but is  in fact  dangerous,  for it  establishes a distance
between actions and words.lxvi
20 On August 25, 2016, Hillary Clinton decided to voice her support for Jones in a tweet
stating that “no one deserves this–‒least of all someone who brings us so much joy.”lxvii
The tweet came soon after her much-discussed speech in Reno that criticized the rhetoric
emanating from the Trump campaign and for the first time featured a mention of the alt-
right by a presidential candidate. According to Clinton, “From the start, Donald Trump
has built his campaign on prejudice and paranoia. He is taking hate groups mainstream
and helping a radical fringe take over the Republican party. His disregard for the values
that make our country great is profoundly dangerous.”lxviii The objective of the speech
was to highlight the links between the Trump campaign and hate groups, singling out the
alt-right by name. Clinton listed some of the most incendiary remarks, for example, citing
Trump’s  role  in  the birther  movement  and his  derogatory comments  about  Mexican
immigrants.  Clinton went on to accuse Trump of empowering fringe elements by his
refusal to condemn racist comments and “pushing discredited conspiracy theories with
racist undertones.”lxix
21 The focus  on Trump’s  history  was  followed by  comments  about  the  appointment  of
Stephen Bannon as a campaign CEO. Clinton summarized Breitbart News as a platform for
“ideas on the extremist fringe of the conservative right.”lxx Although the speech was
promoted  as  a  denunciation  of  the  alt-right, the  movement  itself  was  explicitly
mentioned only briefly toward the end of the speech. “These are racist ideas. Race-baiting
ideas. Anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, anti-women—all key tenets making up an emerging
racist ideology known as the ‘Alt-Right,’” Clinton said. The ideology of the alt-right, as
Clinton saw it, was given relevance by the “de facto merger between Breitbart and the
Trump Campaign.”lxxi The implications of the speech were complex. As expected, Trump
lashed out and accused Clinton of “pandering to the worst instincts in our society” and
“race-baiting to try to get African-American voters.”lxxii However, George Hawley noted
that “[i]n order to have this speech make any sense, she’s going to have to explain what
the alt-right is—anime Nazis and frog memes… and undercurrents of white supremacy.”
He also reflected the concern that this was seen as evidence that they are “playing a role
in the 2016 election.”lxxiii Indeed,  leading voices of  the alt-right were delighted to be
denounced by Clinton, and they reveled in the national spotlight.lxxiv As Clinton’s speech
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made them the focus of attention, this was seen as the legitimatization they had been
waiting for. Andrew Anglin wrote on the day of the speech: “Well guys. We’ve made it.
Hillary Clinton is giving a speech about us today.”lxxv Richard Spencer told the Wall Street
Journal  that  their  “fundamental  obstacle  was  people  having  no  idea  who  we  are.”
Therefore, in Spencer’s view, this mention of the movement by a presidential candidate
meant that they had “made it.”lxxvi
22 In particular,  these  remarks  were a  reflection of  the fact  that  the alt-right  was  less
interested in specific policy issues and more focused on influencing the election process
in  a  rather  general  way.  Subsequently,  the  campaigns  of  both  Clinton  and  Trump,
however ambiguously, provided a platform through which it could extend its sphere of
influence. Whitney Phillips notes rhetorical and behavioral overlaps between Anonymous
and the alt-right,  as  well  as  similarities  in their rise:  “In each case,  previous insular
communities were transformed into forces to be reckoned with. Into monsters, all through
the repeated chanting of their name.”lxxvii The transformation of the alt-right is perhaps
best embodied in the movement’s keen interest in pop culture and aesthetics, both of
which  are  informed  by  the  notion  of  metapolitics.  Luke  O’Brien  observes  that  “for
Spencer and his clique, that process isn’t about influencing policy but rather the way
people saw the world, which would naturally lead to policy changes.”lxxviii Succinctly put,
metapolitics  refers  to  a  struggle  that  is  ultimately  social  and  cultural  rather  than
political. In this context, Clinton’s speech was seen as an opportunity to engage with a
much wider audience and to reframe narratives in their own terms.
 
5. Memetic Hate: Pepe the Frog
23 If  the  use  of  memes is  characteristic  for  the  alt-right,  then one meme in  particular
characterizes  the  role  of  the  movement  in  the  election:  a  popular  cartoon  frog.  In
September, Hillary Clinton’s campaign explained that a recent iteration of Pepe the Frog
was a symbol of white supremacy.  There ensued considerable confusion about why a
presidential candidate was focusing on a cartoon frog.lxxix 
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24 Figure 1. “Smug Frog,” Know Your Meme.lxxx
25 Pepe the Frog,  which was originally invented by comic artist Matt Furie in 2005 and
featured as an anthropomorphic character in a popular comic series Boy’s Club, has since
become  a  subcultural  online  phenomenon,  in  particular  on  4chan  where  the  meme
transmuted into countless different forms and contexts, expressing a variety of emotions.
lxxxi During  the  election,  Pepe  became  a  prominent  Twitter  avatar  for  many  Trump
supporters. Among the popular iterations were images of Pepe as Trump, who himself
tweeted one such image in October 2015.lxxxii
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26 Figure 2. “Very Rare Pepe,” Imgur.lxxxiii 
27 The alt-right association to Pepe came from anti-Semitic and racist illustrations in which
Pepe was decorated with Nazi and white supremacist symbols. This prompted the Clinton
campaign to issue the warning that “in recent months, Pepe’s been almost entirely co-
opted by white supremacists who call  themselves the ‘alt-right,’” labeling Pepe as “a
symbol associated with white supremacy.”lxxxiv The racist iterations of Pepe were used to
draw a line between the alt-right and the Trump campaign. To put this in context, from
one perspective, as argued by Jesse Singal, the offensive illustrations were born out of
online troll culture guided by a desire to provoke outrage.lxxxv From another perspective,
Nicole Hemmer suggested that Trump in fact “validated many of their [alt-right] points of
view, as well as their stylistic approach.”lxxxvi In this sense, Pepe assumed significance as
an embodiment of the stylistic approach of the alt-right.
28 While the creator has no control over the meanings that people give to memes, the white
supremacy connection was explained by Whitney Phillips: “Pepe might not mean white
supremacy  inherently  but  ‘Pepe  means  white  supremacy’  becomes  a  meme  that
perpetuates that connection regardless.” Ryan Milner’s argument echoes this:  “In the
memetic  struggle  for  Pepe’s  fate,  racist  associations  are  pretty  loud  and  therefore
winning out.”lxxxvii The debate over Pepe is a reminder of how online forums operate as a
source of cultural production, as well as a site of contestation of specific meanings. The
appropriation of popular media, as Milner points out, functions as a way to create a novel
impression that is central to the resonance of memetic texts. Milner advances the idea
that the employment of memetic logics gives the public a means to “create, circulate, and
transform texts in the name of political expression.” He cites the example of the Guy
Fawkes mask, which intertwines a populist message and pop culture, and examines its
transformation from “a  symbol  of  failure”  into  “a  rallying cry  for  social  justice.”  In
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contrast to the example given by Milner, Pepe was transformed from a harmless cartoon
character into a symbol of hate, but the memetic logics are the same in both cases.lxxxviii
29 The peculiarity of Pepe’s transformation is that it enabled both campaigns to attack each
other. Addressing a LGBT gala audience on September 9, Clinton stated, “Just to be grossly
generalistic,  you  could  put  half  of  Trump supporters  into  what  I  call  the  basket  of
deplorables—the racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic, you name it.”lxxxix
Clinton called their rhetoric offensive and hateful and blamed Trump for giving a voice to
the “deplorables.” Her comments were followed by a storm of criticism, with almost two-
thirds of Americans objecting to them as unfair. While Clinton later regretted the “half”
part, she still insisted that many Trump supporters fit into those categories.xc Clinton’s
characterization was  seen by Trump,  on the other  hand,  as  a  testimony of  her  true
feelings and bigotry, as “contempt and disdain for so many great Americans.” Chip Berlet
observed that Trump also made use of the comment by fitting it into his populist rhetoric
about liberal elites.  Instead of rejecting it,  Trump supporters embraced the label and
turned it into a kind of unofficial campaign slogan.xci
30 Soon the label was harnessed in images that combined a populist message with popular
culture. In one example, an image from the musical Les Misérables was Photoshopped and
turned into a “Les Deplorables” meme. On September 16, 2016, it was also notably present
at a Trump rally in Miami: when Trump entered the stage, the “Les Deplorables” meme
was projected behind his podium and “Do You Hear the People Sing?” from the musical
was played,  as to emphasize “the song of  angry men.” Trump then opened with the
remark “Welcome to all  of  you deplorables.”xcii Here the meme,  with its  intertextual
popular culture references, was used as an explicit commentary by Trump. In contrast to
“liberal elites” and Clinton’s comments, the symbolism of Les Misérables channeled the
populist image of Trump as the “man of the people.”
31 In another meme, the title of the popular action film The Expendables was changed to “The
Deplorables,” and the faces of Donald Trump, Roger Stone, Alex Jones, and Pepe, among
others, were superimposed on the characters’ bodies on the movie poster.
32 Figure 3. “The Deplorables,” Know Your Meme.xciii
33 Donald Trump, Jr., who was also featured in the meme, posted the image on social media.
“Apparently I made the cut as one of the Deplorables,” Trump, Jr. wrote. Trump’s adviser
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Roger Stone also shared the image, saying he was “so proud to be one of the Deplorables.”
Due  to  the  racist  iterations  of  Pepe,  criticism was  directed at  the  Trump campaign,
forcing them to issue a statement that they did not “deliberately use the symbols and
code white supremacists use to signal their allegiance.”xciv Trump, Jr. declared that he had
never heard of Pepe and was not aware of any negative connotations.xcv However, the fact
that he and Stone posted the image with Pepe meant that they were certainly aware of
the cartoon frog. Conversely, “The Deplorables” image was used by the Clinton campaign
as an example of the Trump campaign and white nationalist connections. In particular,
the Clinton campaign stressed the fact that Trump, Jr. and Stone had posted the image on
social media. Thus, they tried to demonstrate that the Trump campaign continued to
strengthen its ties with the alt-right. Going full circle, a meme that was born out of a
much-criticized comment by Clinton was used to criticize the Trump campaign. 
34 The controversy about Pepe the Frog and the publicity it received in the presidential race
culminated in an announcement by the Anti-Defamation League: “The Anti-Defamation
League (ADL) today identified ‘Pepe the Frog,’  a cartoon character used by haters on
social media to suggest racist, anti-Semitic or other bigoted notions, as a hate symbol.”
Pepe  the  Frog  was  added  to  ADL’s  “Hate  on  Display”  database  because  of  its  racist
incarnations,  which  were  designed  to  “harass  and  spread  hatred  on  social  media,”
according to CEO Jonathan A. Greenblatt. In June, ADL also added the (((echo))) symbol to
its database after it was co-opted by the alt-right and used as visual grammar to identify
Jewish people on social media, metaphorically echoing the old conspiracy of Jews having
global influence.xcvi 
35 These appropriations depend upon the ability to exploit pre-existing cultural texts only
to  impose  new  oppositional  meanings.  The  explainers  and  statements  from  both
campaigns point to the unforeseen ways in which electoral discussions can be and were
stirred by controversial memes and appropriations. If there was confusion over form and
content in attempts to understand the alt-right, then Pepe and other images were crucial
in  spreading  those  messages,  functioning  as  symbols  that  expressed  and  evoked
emotions.xcvii These appropriations exemplify contemporary oppositional efforts, which
are not merely a sign of provocation but a means of engaging the political mainstream.
 
6. Conclusion
36 Soon  after  Donald  Trump’s  election  victory,  members  of  the  alt-right  gathered  to
celebrate  at  a  meeting  in  Washington,  D.C.  In  the  presence  of  many  media  outlets,
Richard  Spencer  was  the  final  speaker  at  the  NPI  conference.  Spencer  declared  in
reference to “meme-magic” that, “though we may use these terms half-jokingly, they
represent something truly important, the victory of will.” He then added, “We willed
Donald Trump into office, we made this dream into reality.” The speech touched upon
ideas of white identity: “America was, until this last generation, a white country, designed
for ourselves and our posterity. It is our creation and our inheritance, and it belongs to
us.” At one point in the speech, Spencer declared “Hail Trump! Hail Our People! Hail
Victory!” while some members of the audience raised their arms in the Nazi salute.xcviii
When Trump was confronted with these statements in an interview by the New York Times
, he officially disavowed the alt-right. Specifically, Trump said: “Of course I condemn. I
disavow and I condemn.”xcix Trump may not need the alt-right anymore, but whether the
alt-right needs Trump anymore remains an open question. 
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37 On one hand, Trump ambivalently never embraced the more hardline views within the
alt-right, nor did he, until the election was finished, explicitly denounce the movement.
On the other hand, while Hillary Clinton had no trouble connecting Trump with the alt-
right,  her speech gave the group its biggest mainstream platform and a considerable
amount of media coverage. Arguably the alt-right was not so much a political force, but a
cultural  force  online,  as  offensive  terms and imagery associated with the movement
surfaced in the mainstream throughout the election cycle. The fact that the alt-right did
not fit neatly into existing media narratives about white supremacy or white nationalism
also entailed a lack of coherent narrative to counter the confusion. Nicole Hemmer refers
to “the problem of journalistic wonder at racism that comes in unexpected packages,”
noting the trap of focusing on style over the substance of racism.c
38 Like Hemmer, Kelly J. Baker reminds us in the New York Times  that the kind of image
makeover the alt-right was engaging in is not new, pointing out that “efforts to dress up
white supremacy” in fact have a precedent. She notes, “While it might seem newsworthy
that today’s alt-right members wear suits and profess academic-sounding racism, they
are an extension of these previous white supremacist movements, dressed up in 21st-
century lingo, social media and fashion.”ci Drawing attention to the tools with which the
alt-right engages the mainstream should also be a means to understand the objectives
beneath  the  new  style  and  mode.  As  the  movement  assumes  different  ideological
positions that do not necessarily complement each other, it is important to identify and
understand  their  differences  alongside  their  commonalities.  A  more  nuanced
understanding  should  also  posit  these  underlying  ideologies,  stylistic  gestures,  and
promotional tactics in relation to the dominant cultural and political tendencies.
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ABSTRACTS
Buoyed by the populist campaign of Donald Trump, the “alt-right,” a loose political movement
based around right-wing ideologies,  emerged as  an unexpected and highly contentious actor
during  the  election  cycle.  The  alt-right  promoted  controversy  through  provocative  online
actions that drew a considerable amount of media attention. This article focuses on the role of
the “alt-right” in the 2016 election by examining its visual and rhetorical efforts to engage the
political  mainstream  in  relation  to  the  campaigns  of  Donald  Trump  and  Hillary  Clinton.  In
particular, the alt-right’s unique style and internal jargon created notable confusion and also
attracted interest by the media, while its promotional tactics included the use of social media and
Internet memes, through which the movement came to epitomize online antagonism in the 2016
election.
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